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Abstract
This paper explores empirically the relation between party’s procedures to nominate can-
didates, such as primaries, and quality of government. Using a panel data of Latin American
countries, I find robust evidence that the quality of government is higher during the mandate
of primary-nominated presidents. The empirical strategy exploits within country variation
and controls for relevant covariates at country and party level. Using an instrumental vari-
able approach with determinants of primary adoption produces similar results. The findings
are consistent with primaries increasing incentives among candidates to improve policy de-
sign, and suggest that party institutions matter for governance.
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1 Introduction
There is a widespread belief that political parties are important for governance. After all, they
are key political actors. They connect politicians to voters, select candidates to run in elections,
and provide the organizational support needed to participate in political life (Duverger, 1965;
White, 2006). Despite their perceived importance, however, there is little empirical evidence
about the role of party institutions on governance and economic policy.
This paper contributes to this debate by exploring the role of a specific party institution
-namely the procedures to nominate candidates- on quality of government. In practice, parties
use nomination procedures with different degrees of internal democracy (Bille, 2001; Hazan and
Rahat, 2006). The procedures range from nomination by party leaders to more democratic
procedures such as primaries. As I discuss below, theory suggests that these institutional
differences may shape candidates’ incentives and political selection, and through those channels
affect economic policies and governance.
I explore the relation between nomination procedures and quality of government using the
case of Latin American presidents. For each president, I obtain information of the nomination
procedure used by her party. The available data distinguish two broad nomination procedures:
primaries (open and close) and non-primaries. As a measure of quality of government, I use an
index of government anti-diversion policies, similar to the one used by Hall and Jones (1999).
I complement this index with a measure of popular trust in the president. The resulting panel
dataset covers 18 Latin American countries from early 1980s to 2008.
The main empirical challenge is the presence of omitted variables that may affect both quality
of government and use of primaries. In that case, differences in quality of government between
primary and non-primary nominated presidents may just reflect unobserved heterogeneity, not
the effect of the nomination procedure.
To address this concern, I exploit within-country variation in the use of primaries. This
allows me to control for time-invariant country characteristics and reduces the scope for bias
due to omitted variables. I complement this strategy with an instrumental variable approach. As
instrument, I use a measure of partisan support of the president’s party before the presidential
election. As I discuss below, the size of partisan support may change the party benefits of
using primaries and hence affect its probability of adoption. Moreover, the first stage is also
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informative of the mechanism linking primaries to quality of government.
I find robust evidence of a positive relation between primaries and quality of government.
The most conservative estimate suggests that the quality of government is 0.16 standard devi-
ations higher during the mandate of primary-nominated presidents. For the average country,
this represents an increase of 10 percent in the measure of quality of government. This result
is explain mainly by increases in quality of bureaucracy and reduction of corruption in gov-
ernment. I also find that primary-nominated presidents enjoy higher rates of popular trust, a
variable highly correlated to popular approval.
The relation between primaries and quality of government is driven by the nomination
procedure of the president, not by the nomination procedure used by other politicians. There is,
for example, no significant difference in quality of government associated to the use of primaries
by the main opposition party. This reduces concerns that the results are just picking up the
effect of election-specific shocks (such as increase in democratic values or popular demand for
using primaries).
A relevant question is why primaries would affect quality of government. To shed light
on this question, I explore the benefits that parties may obtain when using primaries. The
literature on primary determinants suggests at least two main benefits of primaries that may
also affect quality of government. First, primaries may allow parties to select a better candidate
(Adams and Merrill, 2008; Serra, 2011) Second, primaries may allow parties to regulate internal
competition and increase candidates’ incentives, for example to invest in policy design (Caillaud
and Tirole, 2002; Castanheira et al., 2010).1
In a companion paper (Arago´n, 2011), I show that the relative size of partisan support (i.e.
proportion of voters who vote for the party regardless of its candidate’s type) is a determinant
of primary adoption. Moreover, under reasonable assumptions, the relation between primary
adoption and partisan support can be informative of which of these two benefits is more impor-
tant: negative if selection is the main benefit of primaries, or positive if parties use primaries
to increase candidates’ incentives.2
1I discuss these arguments in more detail in Section 5.
2Intuitively, parties with large partisan support have little to win from improving the quality of their candi-
dates. Thus, they would be less likely to use primaries if the main reason is to improve selection. In contrast,
large partisan support decreases competition faced by party candidates, and hence their incentives to invest in
the electoral campaign. In that case the party may improve its electoral performance by increasing intra-party
competition e.g. adopting primaries.
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Based on this insight, I explore the determinants of primary adoption in the sample of pres-
ident’s parties. I find a positive and significant relation between likelihood of primary adoption
and partisan support -measured as the party’s seat share in previous legislative elections. Us-
ing this variable as an instrument confirms the previous result of a positive relation between
primaries and quality of government. I interpret these findings as evidence that primaries may
improve quality of government by increasing incentives among presidential candidates.
This paper relates to a political economics literature studying the effect of nomination pro-
cedures on economic policy.3 Theoretical work suggests that nomination procedures may matter
by changing political representation (Jackson et al., 2007), candidate’s incentives (Caillaud and
Tirole, 2002; Castanheira et al., 2010) or political selection (Adams and Merrill, 2008; Serra,
2011). Consistent with these arguments, Gerber and Morton (1998) find that open primaries
in U.S. are associated to policies closer to citizen’s ideology. In the same context, Besley and
Case (2003) also document differences in size and composition of state government spending
associated to open primaries. To the best of my knowledge, however, there is no evidence of
the effect of nomination procedures on quality of government.
I also view this work as a contribution to the literature on political institutions and economic
performance. Most of this literature focuses on the effects of macro level institutions such as
democracy, electoral rules or form of government.4 This paper complements this literature by
studying the contribution of party institutions to good governance.5
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some background of the Latin
American case and discusses some arguments why nomination procedures may affect governance.
Section 3 explain the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 presents the main results while
section 5 explores possible mechanisms linking primaries to quality of government. Section 6
concludes.
3There is, of course, a large literature examining the effect of nomination procedures on other outcomes
such as information dispersion and acquisition (Meirowitz, 2005), legislators’ ability to compromise (Alvarez and
Sinclair, 2011), or party polarization and loyalty (Ansolabehere et al., 2006; Ansolabehere et al., 2010). Other
papers focus on the sequentiality associated to the use of primaries, specially in the U.S. case. For example,
Knight and Schiff (2010) explore the effect of sequential voting on social learning, while Klumpp and Polborn
(2006) develop a model to examine the effect of primaries on the effectiveness of campaign spending.
4For some recent evidence on the effect of democracy on growth and well-being see Barro (1996), Rodrik and
Wacziarg (2005), Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) and Kudamatsu (forthcoming). The effect of electoral rules
and form of government is thoroughly studied in Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Persson et al. (2003).
5In a recent paper, Cruz and Keefer (2010) find evidence that countries with programmatic parties (i.e. parties
with a well defined ideology) are more successful in implementing public sector reforms.
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2 Background
2.1 Presidential primaries in Latin America
The empirical analysis focuses on the nomination procedures to select presidential candidates
in Latin American democracies. These countries have presidential regimes where the executive
holds significant power and presidency is the most important public office. In this context,
selecting the presidential candidate is an important party decision.
Latin American parties use different procedures to nominate presidential candidates. For
example, between early 1980s and 2008, around 21 percent of Latin American presidents were
nominated in a primary and a third of elections involved at least one primary-nominated can-
didate.
The data I use distinguishes nomination procedures in two broad categories: primaries and
non-primaries. Primaries include both open and closed primaries. In a primary, either voters
or affiliated party members vote to select the candidate. In contrast, non-primaries include less
democratic procedures such as nomination in party conventions or by party leaders. While this
measure may be quite coarse, it captures a key distinction in nomination procedures: the degree
of intra-party competition.6
In most countries there is not a legal requirement to use primaries (Alca´ntara Sa´ez, 2002;
Freidenberg, 2003). Only since mid 1990s some countries -such as Uruguay, Paraguay and
Panama- have included mandatory primaries in their electoral codes. This situation raises
relevant identification concerns given that the use of primaries is a party decision and may be
influenced by other factors also related to the subsequent government performance.
2.2 Why would nomination procedures matter?
Theory suggests several reasons why the candidate nomination procedure would affect quality
of government.7
A first channel is through its effect on political representation. Democratic nomination pro-
cedures -such as primaries- may change the selectorate and, hence, the identity of the median
6The political science literature refers to this feature of selection methods as internal democracy or inclusiveness
(Hazan and Rahat, 2006).
7The discussion of possible channels in this section is not exhaustive. I focus the attention on the main
arguments discussed in the political economics literature.
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voter. In turn, this may affect the policies chosen by competing candidates or the set of candi-
dates willing to run in internal elections.8 To the extend that primaries increase representation
of groups who prefer better government, they would be associated to an improvement in quality
of government. This is the argument put forward by Gerber and Morton (1998) and Besley and
Case (2003) to explain differences in U.S. state policies associated to open primaries.
A second channel is through the effect of nomination procedures on political competition.
Primaries may increase the degree of (intra-party) political competition faced by candidates.
In turn, this may shape candidates’ incentives. For example, Caillaud and Tirole (2002) and
Castanheira et al. (2010) develop models where candidates can exert some effort to improve
policy design, and their electoral performance. In these models, parties use primaries to regulate
political competition and elicit the optimal level of effort from candidates.
The increase in intra-party competition may also improve political selection. In this view,
primaries act as screening devices giving parties an early opportunity to observe the quality of
politicians and to pick the best candidate. This argument is formally developed by Adams and
Merrill (2008) and Serra (2011).
The previous discussion put forward arguments for primaries to increase quality of govern-
ment. There are, however, several reasons why nomination procedures may not matter. First,
the change in political representation may not be relevant for governance if non-economic issues
are more salient. Second, there may be constraints in the ability of the president to affect policy.
Third, other democratic checks and balances may attenuate the effect of nomination process.
For example, electoral competition between parties may be more important in shaping candi-
dates’ incentives and selection. Finally, even if nomination procedures matter, their effect may
be small and not translate into significant changes on the measures of quality of government.
8This would depend of whether we use a standard Downsian electoral competition model or a citizen-candidate
approach.
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3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Data
I use a panel data of 18 Latin American countries that covers the period since early 1980s to
2008.9 The measure of nomination procedures is a dummy indicating whether a president was
nominated as party candidate using a primary (open or close) or not (primary). I also obtain
information about the nomination procedures used by other presidential candidates (primary
opposition). The source of this data is Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2007). This indicator
varies at president-level, while other measures -such as quality of government- have an annual
frequency. To link both variables, I identify the years of a president’s mandate and assign
annual data to each year. In case there are two presidents in power (e.g. transition years) I
assign the year to the president that ruled most of the time.
As a measure of quality of government, I construct an index of government anti-diversion
policies using annual data from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The index is
composed of three indicators of political risk: quality of bureaucracy, corruption in government,
and rule of law. All these indicators are constructed such that higher values represent better
quality, less corruption, or better rule of law, respectively. I normalize these indicators using a
minimax approach, so their values range between 0 and 1, and aggregate them using a simple
average. I interpret larger values of the index of government anti-diversion policies as an indi-
cator of better quality of government. This index is similar to the one used by Hall and Jones
(1999) as a measure of the quality of “the institutions and government policies that determine
the economic environment” (Hall and Jones, 1999, p. 97).10. The components of this index
have also been used in the political economics literature as measures of government efficiency
(Knack and Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999).
In addition, I use a measure of the popular perception of the president’s performance from
the Latinobaro´metro. In particular, I use the proportion of the population, in a given year,
that reports having a lot or some trust in the president.11 This variable is highly correlated to
9This period corresponds to the re-introduction of democratic elections in many countries, after failed military
dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s.
10Hall and Jones (1999) use the average of these three indicators plus risk of expropriation and an index of
government repudiation of contracts. Data on these indices, however, is available until 1997 only. This reduces
the sample size by half. Nonetheless, including this information for the period when it is available produces
similar results.
11The survey question is: “How much trust do you have in the President? . There are four possible answers:
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the president’s approval (correlation=0.91) and has the advantage of having been collected for
a longer period.12 To control for trust in politicians in general, I also construct a measure of
trust in political parties.
Finally, I collect data on variables that may be correlated both to the use of primaries
and quality of government to include as control variables. These variables include country
characteristics -such as degree of democracy, and legal requirement to use primaries- as well as
party features like ideology, age and seat share.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables. Descriptions of all variables and
data sources are available in Appendix A.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev.
I. Nomination procedures
Primary 0.218 0.415
Primary opposition 0.178 0.385
II. Quality of government and popular trust
Index of gov. antidiv. policies 0.535 0.172
Quality of bureaucracy 0.587 0.248
Corruption in government 0.556 0.174
Rule of law 0.463 0.259
Trust in president 0.395 0.133
Trust in political parties 0.211 0.074
III. Additional variables
Democracy index 7.6 1.3
Mandatory primaries 0.178 0.385
Party age 49.2 45.5
Coalition party 0.182 0.388
Seat share 0.445 0.128
Previous seat share 0.257 0.208
Pre-electoral coalition 0.101 0.303
Centrist party 0.125 0.328
Note: See Appendix A for definition of variables and
data sources.
a lot, some, a little, or none.
12Trust in president has been collected since 1997, while president’s approval only since 2002.
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Figure 1: Quality of government and presidential primaries
3.2 Empirical strategy
The aim of the empirical analysis is to estimate the relation between the use of primaries and
quality of government. More precisely, it involves assessing whether there is a difference in the
quality of government during the mandate of primary and non-primary nominated presidents.
Figure 1 depicts this relation. It shows the average quality of government plot against the
proportion of primary-nominated presidents for each country. The correlation is positive which
suggests that the use of primaries is associated to better governance.
This simple cross-country correlation, however, may not be informative of the effect of
candidate nomination procedures. The main identification concern is the presence of omitted
variables. There are other factors that may affect both the party institutional choice and
quality of government such as a party ideology, political environment or a country’s democratic
traditions. In that case, we would not know whether a positive correlation, as the one depicted
in Figure 1, reflects the the use of primaries or the influence of these other factors.
I address this concern twofold. First, I include a rich set of control variables at country and
party level. Second, I exploit within country variation and include country fixed effects in the
main regression. This approach reduces the scope of omitted variables. It may not, however,
fully address relevant identification concerns. For instance, there might still be time-variant
unobserved heterogeneity driving the results. In section 5 I improve upon this identification
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strategy by exploring why parties use primaries and using the suggested determinants as in-
strumental variables.
A second concern relates to the estimation of standard errors. Recall that the measure of
primary varies at president’s mandate level, while the outcome variables vary at annual level.
Thus, the explanatory variable (primary) is constant within the aggregated unit (president’s
mandate). In this case, I need to allow for errors to be correlated within each aggregated unit
(Moulton, 1990). Otherwise, I may underestimate the standard errors and over-reject the null
hypothesis of no significance.
One approach is to cluster the errors at mandate level using the cluster-correlated Huber-
White covariance matrix estimator. An alternative, and more conservative, approach, is to
recognize that the main source of variation is at mandate level, aggregate the annual data
accordingly, and use weighted OLS (Angrist and Pischke, 2008, Ch. 8.2.1.).
In the main exposition in this paper I use this more conservative approach. In particular, I
collapse the annual data by taking the average over a president’s mandate.13 Then I estimate
the following baseline regression:
yij = ηj + βprimaryij + γXij + ij , (1)
where yij is the measure of quality of government (or other outcomes) during the mandate of
president i in country j, and primaryij is the candidate nomination procedure used to select
the ruling president. ηj is a set of country fixed effects, while Xij is a vector of control variables.
In the full specification Xij includes country characteristics such as an index of democracy and
an indicator of mandatory primaries, as well as features of the president’s party such as size
-measured using its seat share during the president’s mandate-, age, and an indicator whether
the party is a coalition. All regressions include quinquennium fixed effects to account for the
time trend.14 Since the observations are averages over a president’s mandate, I estimate the
model using weighted OLS. As weights, I use the number of annual observations.
13Table 7 in Appendix B). replicates the baseline results using annual data and clustering the errors by presi-
dent’s mandate. This alternative procedure produces similar results.
14The quinquennium indicators are associated to the year of the presidential election. I consider the following
periods: 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-1994, and so on. The last period is 2005-2008.
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4 Main results
Table 2 presents the estimates of the baseline regression. Column 1 is a benchmark regression
without any control variable. Column 2 adds several country and party controls. Of particular
interest are covariates that may also explain the use of primaries such as party size (seat share
and seat share2), legal mandate to use primaries (mandatory primaries) and a country’s level
of democracy (democracy index ). Column 3 estimates the full specification including country
fixed effects.15
In all cases, there is a positive and significant correlation between primaries and quality of
government. The most conservative estimate suggests that the quality of government increases
by 0.058 during the mandate of of primary-nominated presidents. This is equivalent to an
increase of 0.16 standard deviations. For the average country, this represents an increase of 10
percent in the measure of quality of government.
To the extent that the covariates and country fixed effects control for unobserved hetero-
geneity, this result could be interpreted as evidence of a positive effect of primaries on quality
of government. Note that the inclusion of country fixed effects reduces the estimates of β by
almost half. This is consistent with the presence of relevant country-specific omitted variables
and motivate the use of country fixed effects.
Next, I explore in more detail the relation between primaries and quality of government.
Recall that the measure of quality is composed by three indicators: quality of bureaucracy,
corruption in government, and rule of law. Columns 4 to 6 estimate the baseline regression,
with the full set of controls, using these three indicators as outcome variables. There is a positive
correlation only between primaries and quality of bureaucracy and corruption in government.16
These two measures have been used as proxies of government efficiency in previous work (Knack
and Keefer, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999). In contrast, the lack of relation with rule of law may
be due to this indicator reflecting more stable institutions, which are less likely to be affected
by the president’s actions.
Columns 7 and 8 perform a placebo test. In both regressions, I replace primary by the
nomination procedure of the candidate from the main opposition party (primary opposition). If
15The democracy index is dropped in this specification since it is the average over a country and thus does not
have within country variation.
16Note that higher values of the indicator of corruption in government represent a perception of less corruption.
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the positive relation between primaries and quality of government is driven by election-specific
factors then we should expect to find a similar relation with primary opposition. For example,
it could be that there is an increase in overall electoral competition or a surge in a country’s
demand for democracy.
The estimates using primary opposition, however, are not significantly different than zero.
Moreover, when including both primary and primary opposition in the same regression (column
8) I find that the correlation with quality of government is entirely driven by primary. This
finding suggests that what matters is the nomination procedure of the winning candidate, not
of other presidential candidates.17
A limitation of the previous measures of quality is that it captures the overall performance
of the government, not necessarily the performance of the president. To address this limitation,
I use a measure of the popular perception of the president’s performance (trust in president).
This variable measures the proportion of the population that reports having a lot or some trust
in the president, and it is highly correlated to a president’s approval rate. A main caveat,
however, is that this variable is available since 1997 onwards. For that reason the number of
available observations is smaller.
Table 3 estimates the baseline regression using trust in the president as outcome variable.
To overcome the loss of power, I do not include country fixed effects.18 Column 1 includes
controls of party size and trust in political parties. This last variable proxy for the general trust
of the public in politicians. Column 2 adds other controls used in the baseline results such as
an index of democracy and party characteristics. Columns 3 and 4 perform a placebo test using
primary opposition.
Consistent with the previous results, I find that primary-nominated presidents also enjoy
higher popular trust. The increase in popular trust is significant: around 6 percentage points
or 0.4 standard deviations. Note that this increase in trust is associated to the president’s
nomination procedure, not to the use of primaries by other parties.
Taken together the previous results suggest that primaries are associated to better govern-
ment. The results are driven by the nomination procedure of the elected executive, not by the
use of primaries in general.
17The results area similar using alternative indicators such as ”use of primaries by any party”.
18Including fixed effects produces similar point estimates, but the results are statistically insignificant.
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Table 3: Primaries and trust in president
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Trust in president
Primary 0.055* 0.062* 0.078**
(0.032) (0.034) (0.038)
Primary opposition -0.047 -0.061
(0.033) (0.038)
Seat share -1.849*** -1.142 -0.889 -0.835
(0.655) (0.909) (0.963) (0.856)
Seat share2 2.272** 1.490 1.179 1.103
(0.843) (1.061) (1.131) (0.999)
Trust in political parties 0.936*** 0.923*** 1.104*** 0.987***
(0.196) (0.200) (0.193) (0.186)
Mandatory primaries -0.036 0.011 -0.021
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Ln(party age) -0.002 0.001 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Coalition party 0.045 0.067 0.031
(0.048) (0.049) (0.050)
Democracy index 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Country fixed effects No No No No
Observations 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0.663 0.701 0.696 0.726
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, **
significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include quinquenium
fixed effects and are weighted using the number of annual observations.
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5 Exploring the mechanism
The results in the previous section suggest a positive relation between primary-nominated can-
didates and quality of government. A crucial question, however, is why democratic nomination
procedures -such as primaries- would affect the performance of elected politicians.
While the list of explanations is potentially quite large, I focus the attention on explanations
related to the party decision to use primaries. Studying primary determinants may shed some
light on the mechanisms through which primaries affect governance. Moreover, it may also give
us guidelines on how to improve the identification strategy.
The literature on primary determinants suggests at least two main reasons why parties
may use primaries: increase in candidates’ incentives (incentive effect) and improvement in
political selection (selection effect).19 The incentive effect comes from the increase in political
competition associated to primaries. In this view, parties use primaries to increase competition
and regulate incentives among candidates to exert effort during the electoral campaign e.g.
investing in policy design (Caillaud and Tirole, 2002; Castanheira et al., 2010). Too much
competition, or too little, would deter candidates to invest in policy design.
A complementary explanation focuses on political selection. In this view, primaries act
as screening devices helping parties to select the best candidate (Adams and Merrill, 2008;
Serra, 2011). In these models, quality of candidate can be interpreted in a broad sense as
valence, charisma or ideological preference. Notice that we can include improvement in political
representation in this argument e.g. allowing parties to select politicians with preferences closer
to the median voter. Either effect (incentive or selection) would improve a party’s electoral
performance and may also explain the increase in quality of government.
In a companion paper (Arago´n, 2011), I develop and test a model of endogenous primaries
that links these two effects to the partisan support enjoyed by a vote-maximizing party.20 I
define partisan support as the proportion of voters who vote for the party regardless of the
quality of its candidate or economic policies. This variable can also be interpreted as an inverse
measure of inter-party political competition: parties with greater partisan support face lower
competition.
19There are other possible effects (positive or negative) of using primaries. I focus on these two mechanisms
because they have been explicitly incorporated in models of endogenous primary adoption, see for example
Castanheira et al. (2010) and Serra (2011).
20See Appendix C for a formal exposition of the model.
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The main insight of the model is that the relation between partisan support and primary
adoption depends of which effect (selection or incentive) is more important. In particular, when
the selection effect is stronger the relation is negative. Intuitively, parties with large partisan
support have less to win from improving the type of their candidate since they already obtain
a large vote share. Hence, everything else constant, they will be less likely to adopt primaries.
In contrast, when the incentive effect is more relevant, the relation may be positive. In this
case, a candidate from a party with a large partisan support has less incentives to exert effort,
since her electoral performance is less dependent of her actions. Hence, the party can elicit
more effort by adopting primaries and increasing intra-party political competition.21
To explore whether incentives or selection effects are more relevant, I analyze the deter-
minants of primary adoption among Latin American presidents. The regression I estimate is:
primaryij = φsupportij + ψWij + νij , (2)
where primaryij is the nomination procedure used to select president i in country j, and
supportij is a measure of the partisan support of the president’s party before the presidential
elections. As a measure of partisan support I use the average party’s seat share in the previ-
ous two legislative elections (previous seat share). Wij is a vector of other possible primary
determinants such as use of primaries by the opposition party, status of party as pre-electoral
coalition, party age and party ideology.22
Table 4 presents the results estimated using a linear probability model. Column 1 estimates
the most parsimonious specification. Columns 2 to 4 add controls variables and country fixed
effects. In all cases, there is a positive and significant correlation between the measure of
partisan support (previous seat share) and the probability of using a primary.23 I interpret
this result as evidence that a main reason why parties use primaries is to increase incentives
among candidates e.g. to invest in policy design. In turn, this may explain the positive relation
observed between primaries and quality of government.
21In the model, candidates can exert effort on policy design and attract non-partisan voters. For that reason,
the party strictly prefers candidates exerting higher effort.
22These variables have already been discussed in the literature of primary determinants. For example, using
a sample of Latin American presidential candidates, Kemahlioglu et al. (2009) documents a positive relation
between primary adoption and previous vote share, status as pre-electoral coalition and centrist ideology.
23Exploiting within party variation and a larger sample, Arago´n (2011) finds a similar positive relation between
partisan support and primary adoption.
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Table 4: Primary determinants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary
Previous seat share 0.613*** 0.578*** 0.390* 0.599**
(0.196) (0.193) (0.219) (0.238)
Primary opposition 0.245** 0.218* 0.342**
(0.120) (0.111) (0.128)
Pre-electoral coalition 0.528*** 0.726***
(0.130) (0.187)
Centrist party -0.176 -0.257*
(0.112) (0.150)
Ln(party age) 0.035 -0.011
(0.029) (0.043)
Country fixed effects No No No Yes
Observations 101 101 88 88
R-squared 0.202 0.246 0.382 0.582
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%,
** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include quin-
quenium fixed effects.
The previous findings about primary determinants suggest a way to improve the identifica-
tion strategy. In particular, they point out to measures of partisan support as instruments for
primary adoption.
Table 5 displays the results of that exercise. It estimates the baseline regression (1) by
2SLS and using previous seat share as an instrument for the use of primaries. Column 1 to 3
replicate the baseline results presented in Table 2. Column 1 estimates the most parsimonious
specification, while columns 2 and 3 populate the model with control variables, such as party’s
size and age and country’s democracy index, well as country fixed effects. Column 4 adds as
included instruments other primary determinants discussed in Table 4 such as party ideology,
status as a pre-electoral coalition, and use of primaries by the main opposition party. The
panel at the bottom displays the first stage and confirms the positive relation between partisan
support and primary adoption.24
Note that in all the cases, the results confirm the positive and significant correlation between
primaries and quality of government. The estimates are even larger than in the OLS regressions.
A possible explanation is that the instrumental variable estimates the local average treatment
24See Table 6 in Appendix B for the full first-stage results.
17
effect. Hence, it reflects the effect of primaries in cases when the president’s party adopt them
mainly to increase intra-party competition and not for other reasons. The magnitude of the
effect in this case is likely to be larger than for the average party.
These results, however, should be interpreted with caution. The instrument would be valid
to the extent that, conditional on other control variables, partisan support affects quality of
government only through its effect on the party choice of nomination procedure. I do control
for other possible primary determinants and factors that may influence quality of government
such as current party size (seat share), age, ideology, etc. There is the possibility, however, that
there are other unobserved variables correlated both to the measure of partisan support and
quality of government.
6 Final remarks
This paper studies empirically the relation between party nomination procedures and quality
of government. Using the case of Latin American presidential candidates, I find evidence of
a positive and robust correlation between the use of democratic procedures such as primaries-
and quality of government. This relation seems to be driven by the increase in intra-party
competition, and the subsequent increase in candidates pre-electoral incentives e.g. to invest in
policy design.
The main contribution of the paper is to take a step towards studying empirically the
importance of party organizations for governance. This is an aspect of democracies which is
still not well understood, but that may be relevant to understand the effectiveness of other
checks and balances such as competitive elections or informative media.
I focus only on candidate nomination procedures. In reality, party organizations have much
richer institutional features. There are, for example, differences in the procedures to recruit
and train politicians, communicate with citizens, or finance their activities. Studying this
institutional heterogeneity may help us understand how parties work and, ultimately, how
they contribute to the functioning of democracy. While beyond the scope of this paper, these
questions deserve further investigation.
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Table 5: Primaries and quality of government: IV approach
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Index of government anti-diversion policies
Primary 0.258* 0.741* 0.354* 0.397*
(0.145) (0.387) (0.190) (0.207)
Seat share 1.970 1.605* 1.578*
(1.284) (0.837) (0.918)
Seat share2 -2.018 -1.810* -1.987*
(1.499) (0.967) (1.163)
Mandatory primaries -0.326* -0.152* -0.167*
(0.176) (0.087) (0.097)
Ln(party age) -0.062* -0.008 0.004
(0.035) (0.022) (0.024)
Coalition party -0.014 -0.015 0.049
(0.121) (0.093) (0.094)
Democracy index 0.017
(0.025)
Primary (opposition) -0.120
(0.100)
Pre-electoral coalition -0.126
(0.128)
Centrist party -0.090
(0.097)
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes
First stage: Dependent variable = Primary
Previous seat share 0.629*** 0.458** 0.613** 0.580**
(0.187) (0.223) (0.293) (0.274)
F-stat excl. instruments 11.26 4.22 4.37 4.47
Observations 96 80 78 70
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significant at
10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions
include quinquenium fixed effects. First stage only reports estimates
of excluded instruments. See Table 6 in Appendix B for full results of
first stage. All regressions are estimated using 2SLS and are weighted
using the number of annual observations.
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A Variables and data sources
I. Nomination procedures
Variable Description Source
Primary 1 if president was nominated in a primary Carey and Polga-Hecimovich
(2007)
Primary opposi-
tion
1 if candidate of main opposition party
was nominated in a primary
Carey and Polga-Hecimovich
(2007). Definition of main
opposition party comes from
Database of Political Institu-
tions 2010.
II. Quality of government and popular trust
Variable Description Source
Quality of bu-
reaucracy
Assessment of the institutional strength
and quality of the bureaucracy. Value nor-
malized to 0-1. Higher values reflect bet-
ter bureaucracy.
International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG)
Corruption in
government
Assessment of corruption within political
system. Value normalized to 0-1. Higher
values reflect lower corruption.
International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG)
Rule of law Assessment of the strength and impartial-
ity of the legal system and popular obser-
vance of the law. Original name in ICRG
is ”Law and Order”. Value normalized to
0-1.
International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG)
Index of gov-
ernment anti-
diversion policies
Average of previous 3 variables.
Trust in president Percentage of population that has a lot
or some trust in president. Omitted cate-
gories are: little or no trust in president.
Latinobaro´metro
Trust in political
parties
Percentage of population that has a lot or
some trust in political parties. Omitted
categories are: little or no trust in political
parties.
Latinobaro´metro
24
III. Other variables
Variable Description Source
Democracy index Country average of index of institutional-
ized democracy. Score 0-10.
Polity IV
Mandatory pri-
maries
1 if country’s electoral legislation required
use of primaries.
Alca´ntara Sa´ez (2002), Frei-
denberg (2003) and Carey and
Polga-Hecimovich (2007)
Centrist party 1 if president’s party is centrist (e.g. party
advocates strengthening private enterprise
in a social-liberal context)
Database of Political Institu-
tions 2010 ?
Seat share Proportion of (lower house) seats obtained
by the president’ party in the legislative
election held simultaneously or immedi-
ately before the presidential election.
Center on Democratic Perfor-
mance and Political Database
of the Americas
Previous seat
share
Average seat share obtained by the presi-
dent’s party in two legislative elections be-
fore the presidential election.
Center on Democratic Perfor-
mance and Political Database
of the Americas
Party age Age of president’s party in the year of
presidential election (years)
Political Database of the
Americas
Coalition party 1 if president endorsed by more than one
political party before or after the selection
process.
Carey and Polga-Hecimovich
(2007)
Pre-electoral
coalition
1 if president was endorsed by more than
one political party before the selection
process.
Carey and Polga-Hecimovich
(2007) and Kemahlioglu et al.
(2009).
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B Additional results
Table 6: Primaries and quality of government: first stage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary
Previous seat share 0.629*** 0.458** 0.613** 0.580**
(0.187) (0.223) (0.293) (0.274)
Seat share -0.594 -1.889 -2.126
(1.635) (1.860) (1.724)
Seat share2 0.420 1.634 2.642
(1.877) (2.200) (2.089)
Mandatory primaries 0.321** 0.256 0.163
(0.147) (0.174) (0.186)
Ln(party age) 0.047 -0.055 -0.057
(0.032) (0.052) (0.051)
Coalition party 0.158 -0.134 -0.077
(0.138) (0.146) (0.196)
Democracy index 0.035
(0.033)
Primary (opposition) 0.277
(0.181)
Pre-electoral coalition 0.338*
(0.193)
Centrist party -0.137
(0.169)
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 96 80 78 70
R-squared 0.233 0.372 0.369 0.501
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significant at 10%, **
significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. All regressions include quinque-
nium fixed effects. The results are the first stage estimates of regressions in
Table 5.
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Table 7: Primaries and quality of government - using annual data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Index of government anti-diversion policies
Primary 0.097** 0.110*** 0.049** 0.048*
(0.043) (0.036) (0.024) (0.024)
Primary (opposition) 0.027 0.006
(0.029) (0.027)
Seat share 1.439* 0.840* 0.703 0.835*
(0.822) (0.455) (0.450) (0.453)
Seat share2 -1.336 -0.951* -0.798 -0.942*
(1.016) (0.526) (0.513) (0.522)
Mandatory primaries -0.111** -0.051 -0.045 -0.053
(0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043)
Ln(party age) -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 -0.011
(0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Coalition party 0.084* -0.073 -0.079 -0.073
(0.048) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Democracy index 0.032**
(0.013)
Country F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 388 327 327 327 327
R-squared 0.145 0.312 0.707 0.700 0.707
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at pres-
ident’s mandate level. * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and ***
significant at 1%. All regressions include year fixed effects.
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- NOT FOR PUBLICATION -
C A model of endogenous primaries
This section is based on a model developed in Arago´n (2011). The model analyzes the party
decision to use primaries and stresses two possible benefits: gains from creating incentives among
candidates (incentive effect) and gains from improving candidate selection (selection effect).
These two mechanisms for primary adoption have received special attention in the literature
of primary determinants. In a seminal paper, Caillaud and Tirole (2002) model primaries as
tools to regulate political competition and maximize the effort put by politicians in the design
of electoral platforms. In a complementary view, Adams and Merrill (2008) and Serra (2011)
develop models of primary adoption where primaries improve selection of the candidate with
better campaigning skills. In a related work, Castanheira et al. (2010) develop a model of
primary adoption that include both the incentive and selection effects. Their model is richer
since it includes the strategic interaction between two parties and voters. This allows for parties
to compete by choosing the nomination procedure, and use it as a signal of politician’s quality.
C.1 The basic setup
Consider an office-seeking party that nominates a candidate to run in presidential elections.
The vote share obtained by the party candidate depends of the quality of the candidate qc, the
effort exerted by the party candidate during the electoral campaign e, and the relative size of the
party’s partisan support (i.e. citizens who will vote for the party regardless of the candidate’s
type or effort) λ.25. In particular, the party’s vote share is
λ+ (1− λ)(φsqc + φie),
The parameters φs and φi capture the relative importance of selection and incentives to
attract non-partisan voters. The element (1−λ)(φsqc+φie) can be interpreted as the proportion
of non-partisan voters attracted to the party candidate due to is quality qc or effort e.
I define e as the effort exerted by the candidate during the electoral campaign. In Caillaud
25Alternatively, we can interpret λ as an inverse measure of inter-party political competition, as in Besley et
al. (2010)
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and Tirole (2002) and Castanheira et al. (2010), this effort is interpreted as investments on
improving policy design. More broadly, it can represent any pre-electoral action that increases
the candidate’s electoral performance such as participation in public debates, canvassing, or
campaign spending. In contrast, quality represents an invariant characteristic of the politician
that improves her electoral performance. It could correspond to the campaigning skills as in
Adams and Merrill (2008) or to the politician’s charisma, honesty or valence.
Before nominating its candidate, the party needs to choose a nomination procedure. There
are two nomination procedures N = (P,NP ), where P stands for primary and NP for non-
primary, respectively. If the party uses NP , a politician is randomly selected and automatically
becomes the party candidate. In contrast, under P , two randomly drawn politicians compete
in internal elections and the party picks up its preferred candidate. The party observes both
politicians’ quality and effort perfectly. The level of effort, however, is decided by the politician
before the nomination takes place.
Let us denote the expected vote share under nomination procedure N as VN , and the
electoral benefit from using primaries as V ≡ VP − VNP . I assume that the probability of using
a primary is increasing on V .
The timing of events is as follows:
1. Party chooses a nomination procedure.
2. Politicians are randomly chosen to be considered in the party nominations.
3. Politicians decide level of effort.
4. Party nominates a candidate.
5. Candidate runs in general election.
C.2 Selection effect
Let us start with a case where only selection matters. In this case, φs = 1 and φi = 0 and
hence the expected party vote share is VN = λ+ (1− λ)E(qc|N ). Note that the party is a vote
maximiser and hence strictly prefers a higher q.
Politicians’ quality is uniformly distributed, q ∼ U [0, 1]. In a non-primary, a random politi-
cian becomes the party candidate, thus E(qc|NP ) = 12 . In contrast, in a primary, the party is
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able to select the best candidate among the two randomly selected politicians. Let q1 and q2
be the quality of the two randomly drawn politicians, then E(qc|P ) = E(max{q1, q2}) = 23 .26
Note that primaries improve political selection by giving the the party the opportunity
to observe the quality of the potential candidates. The improvement in candidate selection
translates into better electoral performance. In particular, the expected electoral gain from
using primaries is V = (1− λ)(E(qc|P )− E(qc|NP )) > 0.
The electoral gain from primaries is decreasing in λ. Intuitively, a party with a large electoral
advantage benefits less from improving candidate’s quality, and thus the selection benefit from
primaries is smaller. This result implies that the probability of using a primary, which is
positively related to V , would also be decreasing in λ.
C.3 Incentive effect
Let us consider now an alternative scenario where only incentives matter. In that case, φs = 0
and φi = 1, and thus the party’s vote share is λ+ (1− λ)eN , where eN is the candidate’s effort
under nomination procedure N .
The politicians’ utility depends of some egorents from office, normalized to 1, minus the
cost of effort. Note that a politician wins office only when the party wins the general election
and the politician wins the party nomination. For simplicity, I assume that the probability the
party wins the election is equal to the party vote share and a quadratic cost of effort. This
implies that the expected utility of a politician under nomination procedure N is
UN = [λ+ (1− λ)e] Pr(win party nomination|N )− ce
2
2
,
where c is a cost shifter high enough to guarantee eP , eNP < 1. A politician’s outside option
gives her a utility of zero.
26To see this, define G(x) = Pr(max{q1, q2} < x). Note that G(x) = Pr(q1 < x) × Pr(q2 < x) = x2. Hence
E(max{q1, q2}) =
∫ 1
0
x dG = 2
3
.
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Optimal effort In a non-primary, the randomly selected politician is also the party candidate.
Hence the candidate’s optimal effort is simply
eNP = arg max
e
λ+ (1− λ)e− ce
2
2
=
1− λ
c
.
Under a primary, however, the optimal effort can be thought of as the outcome of a se-
quential game between politicians and the party. In a first stage, the politicians simultaneously
decide their level of effort. In a second stage, the party picks up the best available candidate.
Recall that the effort level, similarly to the politician’s quality in the previous case, is perfectly
observable by the party.
Since the party maximizes vote share, it strictly prefers the candidate with the higher e. By
symmetry, both politicians exert the same level of effort, and thus have the same probability
of nomination. This setup resembles a Bertrand competition where two identical politicians
compete between them for the party nomination by promising to exert some effort.
In the unique SPNE, both politicians exert the maximum possible level of effort such that
their expected utility is zero. Hence, eP solves:
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UP (eP ) ≡ [λ+ (1− λ)eP ]1
2
− ce
2
P
2
= 0
Lemma 1 In a primary, the effort level exerted by the party candidate is greater than in a
non-primary: eP > eNP . The difference eP − eNP is increasing in λ.
Proof. Note that UP (eNP ) =
λ
2 > 0 and that U
′
P (eNP ) = −1−λ2 < 0. Together these results
imply that eP > eNP . For the second part of the lemma, recall that eNP =
1−λ
c , thus
deNP
dλ = −1c .
Taking total derivatives to UP (eP ) we obtain
deP
dλ =
(1−eP )/2
c(eP−eNP /2) which is positive since eP < 1,
by construction, and eP > eNP .
Similar to the models by Caillaud and Tirole (2002) and Castanheira et al. (2010), primaries
increase internal competition and candidate’s effort. A less obvious result is that the difference
27To see this consider a possible strategy where both politicians offer the same level of effort ea < eP and have
a probability of nomination equal to 1
2
. Since the probability of nomination increases to 1 by a small increase
in effort ea + , a politician will find it a profitable unilateral deviation, and the strategy profile will not be an
equilibrium. Similar argument applies for strategies with different effort level.
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increases with the party electoral advantage. Intuitively, the increase in λ reduces the marginal
benefit of effort, and hence eNP . In contrast, higher λ increases the expected benefit from
holding office and hence the maximum effort that politicians are willing to exert in a competitive
primary.
The increase in candidate’s effort translates into better electoral performance. In particular,
the party expected gain from using primaries (the incentive gain) is V ≡ (1 − λ)(eP − eNP ).
Note that, in general, the sign of dVdλ = (1−λ)d(eP−eNP )dλ − (eP −eNP ) is ambiguous. On the one
hand, there is a first order effect of increasing the difference (eP − eNP ), as shown in Lemma 1.
On the other hand, there is a second order effect of reducing the marginal benefit of improving
effort . We can show, however, that:
Lemma 2 If the electoral advantage is not too large (λ < λ¯), the incentive gain from using
primaries increase with the party electoral advantage, dVdλ > 0.
Proof. Using the proof of Lemma 1 and the definition of eNP , we can write
∂V
∂λ = 2eNP −
eP +
eNP (1−eP )
2eP−eNP . Note that if eP < 2eNP then
dV
dλ Q 0, but if eP < 2eNP , then
dV
dλ > 0, but if
eP < 2eNP we can unambiguously state that
dV
dλ Q 0. The condition eP < 2eNP is satisfied if
U ′P (2eNP ) < 0 and UP (2eNP ) < 0. U
′
P (2eNP ) < 0 since U
′
P < 0 for any e >
eNP
2 . To evaluate
the second condition, note that U ′P (2eNP ) = −1c [λ2− λ( c2 + 2) + 1]. This expression is negative
if λ ∈ (0, λ¯), where λ¯ = 1 + c4 −
√
(c/2+2)2−4
2 .
C.4 Summary
The model highlights two electoral benefits from primaries: selection and incentive gains. More
importantly, it predicts a differentiated effect of the party electoral advantage (λ) on the elec-
toral benefits V , and through this channel on the probability of adopting a primary. We can
summarize the previous results as follows:
Proposition 3 Under the assumption that the likelihood of using a primary is positively cor-
related to their net benefits, V , then:
1. when the selection effect dominates, the probability of using primaries is decreasing in λ,
2. when the incentives effect dominates, and λ is not too large (λ < λ¯), the probability of
using primaries is increasing in λ.
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Intuitively, the increase in λ reduces the gains from selecting a better candidate, since the
party has a larger partisan support. This reduces the magnitude of the selection effect. In
contrast, the reduction in inter-party competition associated to a larger λ reduces candidates
incentives to exert effort. In turn, this increases the gains from increasing intra-party competi-
tion and makes the use of primaries more attractive.
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